structure for horizontal merger analysis established in Philadelphia National Bank. According to Baker Hughes, the government (the usual plaintiff in a merger case) satisfi es an initial burden of production by demonstrating that the merger 'will lead to undue concentration in the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area'. 9 That showing 'establishes a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen competition' (the legal standard of the Clayton Act). 10 A burden of production then shifts to the defendants, the merging fi rms, to off er evidence that rebuts the presumption. 'The more compelling the [government's] prima facie case, the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.'
11 If the defendant succeeds in its rebuttal, then the government must proff er additional evidence of anticompetitive eff ect. At all times the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the government.
In practical application, though, the structural presumption was accorded little weight in Baker Hughes. The court described market concentration as 'a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future competitiveness', emphasized the variety of factors that defendants could rely upon to rebut the government's prima facie case based on market concentration, and declared that '[t] he Supreme Court has adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach' to evaluating horizontal mergers.
12 Using this framework, the circuit court upheld a lower court decision declining to enjoin the acquisition of a fi rm with a 17.5 per cent market share by a rival with a 40.8 per cent market share. It permitted the merger to proceed notwithstanding that the transaction increased concentration substantially in a market that is highly concentrated by contemporary standards.
But the structural presumption has not disappeared. A decade later, the DC Circuit -the same court that decided Baker Hughes -in Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co. , reversed a district court decision denying a preliminary injunction in a merger challenge and directed the district court to enjoin the merger. 13 The appeals court in Heinz followed the burdenshifting framework set forth in Baker Hughes. The court concluded that the defendants had not successfully rebutted the presumption of harm to competition created by a merger that would have combined fi rms with 17.4 per cent and 15.4 per cent market shares, in a market where the leading fi rm had a 65 per cent market share. Had the merger not been enjoined, the transaction would have created a two-fi rm market. The appellate panel found clear error in the district court's factual fi ndings that the effi ciencies from merger would allow the merged fi rm to compete more eff ectively against the dominant fi rm, thereby removing the factual underpinning to the defendants' central rebuttal argument. With no defense rebuttal, the structural presumption carried the day for the government. 
III The role of market defi nition
When courts refer to market concentration, they are concerned with the number of signifi cant rivals and the distribution of the market shares of those fi rms. In order to determine market shares, it is necessary to defi ne a market within which those shares will be measured and identify the fi rms that participate in that market. A market is defi ned in terms of a set of products and a geographic region; accordingly, it is common to speak of the product market and the geographic market. Market defi nition under the enforcement agency merger guidelines turns on assessing the economic force of buyer substitution. 15 The importance of buyer substitution to antitrust analysis is evident from the following simple model of price determination in a homogeneous product industry:
L 5 q/e (10.1)
In equation (10.1), L is the Lerner Index of price-cost margin (price less marginal cost, as a fraction of price), e is the elasticity of market demand (defi ned as a positive number), and q indexes oligopoly behavior. With perfect competition (price-taking), price equals marginal cost, so q 5 0. If the industry behaves like a monopolist, choosing the joint profi tmaximizing price, then the Lerner Index equals the inverse elasticity of market demand, so q 5 1. Other forms of oligopoly interaction would generally be expected to lead to price to fall between the competitive and monopoly levels, so 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
16 Equation (10.1) shows why buyer substitution (here summarized as the elasticity of demand) plays a critical role in determining whether fi rms can exercise market power. If market demand is highly elastic, it is immediately evident that the industry would not be a valuable monopoly -making antitrust enforcement unnecessary -regardless of how successful the fi rms are in achieving a price close to the joint profi t-maximizing level (that is, regardless of how closely q approaches one).
The antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers eff ectively separates the determination of e from the analysis of how the merger would alter q. The task of market defi nition is to identify a set of products and regions that would be a valuable monopoly, not undermined by buyer substitution of outside goods and services or locations. When markets are defi ned for merger analysis, the focus is entirely on buyer substitution. Later steps in merger review -the analyses of market concentration, competitive eff ects, entry and effi ciencies -ask whether the merger would likely lead to higher prices by altering the oligopoly interaction (whether the merger would increase q).
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IV Measuring market concentration
Once a market is defi ned, the market participants are identifi ed 17 and market shares are assigned. 18 During the 1960s and 1970s, the most commonlyemployed summary statistic was the combined market share of the top four fi rms (often written C 4 ). This statistic has been replaced in common practice by the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), defi ned as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the market participants. 19 (If the market shares are measured as fractions, then the HHI will lie between 0 and 1. In antitrust practice, market shares are routinely expressed as percentages (e.g., recorded as 20 rather than as 0.20), so the HHI lies between 0 and 10 000.)
One traditional economic justifi cation for using the HHI as a concentration measure views it as a measure of cartel stability. 20 Another relates it to the price elevation in static non-cooperative oligopoly models. 21 Neither of these justifi cations for relying on market concentration to infer competitive eff ects of merger ties competitive eff ects tightly to market concentration, however. This is not surprising, because, as will be discussed below in connection with the analysis of competitive eff ects of merger, a wide range of factors beyond market concentration also aff ect price determination in oligopoly.
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The empirical literature relating market structure and market power provides additional support for the concern in merger analysis with high and increasing market concentration. 23 That literature fi nds that increases in concentration, particularly substantial ones, may generate large increases in price -though price increases are not inevitable in concentrated markets and many factors other than concentration are also important in determining price and the competitive eff ects of merger. 24 The empirical literature does not provide a strong basis for choosing any particular measure of market concentration, though it is not inconsistent with the common modern antitrust practice of using the HHI to represent concentration.
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V Competitive eff ects
Contemporary horizontal merger analysis sharply distinguishes the possibility of coordinated competitive eff ects of merger from unilateral competitive eff ects. As will be seen, market shares and market concentration matter in those distinct analyses in diff erent ways. Concentration can be informative with respect to each type of competitive eff ects analysis, though in each case, with the right information, competitive eff ects can also be understood without reference to shares and concentration.
A Coordinated competitive eff ects
Coordinated eff ects may arise through formal or informal cooperation by fi rms to reduce industry output and raise price. They include cartels, but they also include arrangements that would not count as agreements under Sherman Act §1. The analysis of coordinated competitive eff ects addresses two issues: whether the market is conducive to coordination, and whether the merger matters.
The fi rst issue, whether the market is conducive to coordination, turns on whether the fi rms participating in the market can solve their 'cartel problems': reaching a consensus on the terms of coordination, deterring members from cheating on that consensus, and preventing new competition (either expansion by excluded rivals or new entries). Notwithstanding these cartel problems, coordination can and at times does succeed. Pricefi xing conspiracies are regularly uncovered by antitrust enforcers, and they sometimes involve large, sophisticated fi rms. Moreover, empirical economic research has identifi ed coordinated conduct in some concentrated industries and, as explained below, economic models of repeated oligopoly interaction show that higher-than-competitive coordinated pricing is often plausible even absent an express agreement on price.
Much as merger analysis examines buyer substitution separately, by devoting the market defi nition step to the exclusive consideration of this economic issue, it focuses on rivalry separately from entry. Accordingly, the competitive eff ects discussion below will address the two cartel problems that relate to rivalry among market participants -reaching consensus and deterring cheating -but not the third, entry by new competitors.
26
Coordinating fi rms must reach a consensus on the terms of coordination -for example, what price each will charge or what output it will produce -without engaging in the kind of negotiations that create an unlawful agreement. Reaching consensus on the terms of coordination could be a challenge even if fi rms are symmetric, because each would prefer to engineer a lower industry output and higher industry price mainly through output reduction by its rivals. One way fi rms might solve the problem of reaching consensus is by making some coordinated outcome 'focal' (simple and obvious, or self-evident). For example, a particular coordinated price could be selected through leader-follower behavior, or a market division based on geography or historical customer relationships might be focal.
Coordination is not inevitable even if it would be profi table for all fi rms and the fi rms can identify consensus terms of coordination, because individual fi rms may have an incentive to cheat on those terms. They may fi nd it more profi table to reduce price below what the terms of coordination would require if in doing so they can expand output suffi ciently. To deter such conduct, a successful cartel must fi nd a way to detect cheating rapidly and commit to punishing the cheater (perhaps merely by returning to the competitive price).
A range of familiar market features are generally thought to aff ect whether fi rms can be expected to reach consensus and deter cheating -and thus whether the market is conducive to coordination (putting aside entry issues). Product heterogeneity and complex, changing products are both thought likely to frustrate coordination by making it diffi cult for fi rms to reach terms of coordination, though these diffi culties are not invariably insurmountable. 27 Features that allow a fi rm to expand output rapidlyperhaps a fi rm's own excess capacity, or vertical integration -may make cheating easy and, in consequence, frustrate coordination. Features that lead cheating fi rms to expect that a severe price war would result from the breakdown of a coordinated arrangement will discourage cheating, thereby facilitating coordination. These features might include excess capacity in the hands of a fi rm's rivals, inelastic market demand, or low marginal costs relative to market prices. Features of the market that allow fi rms to cheat by making extensive sales without detection facilitate coordination. These may include private or confi dential transactions, or 'lumpy' sales and large buyers. They may also include unpredictable market demand, which might make it diffi cult for a fi rm experiencing a sales drought to learn that the explanation is a rival's cheating rather than a random slowdown in business.
Market concentration is also thought to help fi rms solve their cartel problems. With fewer fi rms it may be easier for fi rms to reach consensus on terms of coordination, in much the same way that it is easier to coordinate calendars and schedule a dinner party the fewer the people involved. It may also be easier for fi rms to notice rapidly that a rival is cheating when only a few fi rms participate in the market. The traditional rationale for challenging a merger as likely to facilitate coordination builds on this view: a reduction in the number of fi rms through merger, particularly when the transaction involves sizeable fi rms, increases the odds of industry coordination. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory because it is more of a statistical prediction than an appeal to a mechanism that would show why the merger matters. For example, it does not provide a basis for saying one possible merger in an industry presents more of a competitive threat than another, other than by reference to the size of the fi rms involved.
Industry coordination is understood among economists today as the product of a repeated oligopoly interaction, and is most often modeled as an infi nitely-repeated oligopoly supergame (or to the same eff ect, as a fi nitely repeated interaction with uncertain termination). 28 This approach promises to off er a richer understanding of how coordination works and why a merger might matter, as suggested by the simple model set forth below.
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The central idea of the theoretical models is that successful coordination requires each fi rm participating in the market to prefer coordination to cheating. Suppose that coordinating fi rms reach consensus on the industry price P and on the market shares for each fi rm, denoted s i for fi rm i. 30 For example, the industry price might be determined through leader-follower behavior, by which the leader makes a particular price focal, and the market shares might be determined through some other focal rule, such as preservation of the shares or customer relationships previously obtained. Industry output is Q(P) each period, with Q'(P) , 0, so fi rm i sells the quantity s i Q each period. Suppose further that fi rms have constant marginal costs, which may diff er across fi rms, and face capacity constraints, which again may diff er across fi rms. Let fi rm i have marginal cost c i and production capacity per period of k i . Assume k i ≤ Q*, where Q*(P*) is the industry output that would be produced were the industry to choose the joint profi t-maximizing (monopoly) price P*. Let d represent the discount factor, which all fi rms share, with 0 , d , 1.
31 Assume further that if a fi rm chooses to cheat on a coordinated arrangement, it cuts price to just under the cartel price (so the industry price remains eff ectively P) and in doing so is able to attract so much business as to sell to its full capacity for T periods. If the industry price does not change, aggregate industry output Q remains unchanged as well; the cheating fi rm steals business from its rivals without expanding the market.
With this setup, fi rm i earns profi ts from coordination of (P − c i )s i Q each period, and the discounted present value of its stream of profi ts from coordination equals [(P − c i )s i Q]/ (1-d) . If instead the fi rm cheats, it earns profi ts [(P − c i )k i ] for each of T periods, and none thereafter (as the coordinated arrangement breaks down permanently once rivals detect cheating and react), creating a stream of total profi ts after cheating with a discounted present value of [(P − c i 
32 Accordingly, each fi rm will choose to participate in the coordinated arrangement rather than cheat so long as
. 0, this incentive constraint simplifi es to:
The numerator of the left hand expression in equation (10.2), s i Q(P), represents the fi rm's output in any period at the coordinated price P. The denominator of the same expression, k i T, represents the total output that a fi rm would produce by cheating before its cheating is detected and its rivals respond by lowering price. Accordingly, the left hand expression in equation (10.2) is the ratio of the fi rm's single period output, if coordination succeeds, to the fi rm's total output while cheating. The right hand expression,
, approaches zero when the discount factor approaches one , then the fi rm will prefer cheating to continued coordination, and a coordinated arrangement will break down or fail to form in the fi rst place. The ratio on the left hand side falls as the coordinated price P rises.
The numerator of the ratio on the left hand side of equation (10.2), output in any period during which coordination succeeds, refl ects the benefi t the fi rm obtains from continued cooperation. A fi rm with a larger output has more to gain from coordinated pricing than a fi rm that sells less. The denominator of the ratio, the output that a fi rm would produce by cheating while its rivals attempt to cooperate, refl ects the fi rm's ability to expand output before its rivals catch on and cut price. 33 Thus, a fi rm is more likely to prefer cheating to continued coordination as its benefi t from coordination declines and its ability to profi t by cheating rises.
Equation (10.2) makes the familiar 'folk theorem' point that coordination will arise if every fi rm cares enough about the future to be deterred from cheating today by the threat of future punishment. That is, if the discount factor d is large enough, the right hand side of equation (10.2) can be made arbitrarily small, so equation (10.2) will be satisfi ed for all fi rms. Moreover, if equation (10.2) is satisfi ed for all fi rms, so that coordination succeeds, it is likely that coordination could be stable at a range of coordinated prices; this is another common 'folk theorem' result. Moreover, if cheating can occur for a suffi ciently long time without detection and punishment (that is, if T is large enough), then equation (10.2) will not hold, so no fi rm would fi nd it more profi table to cooperate than to cheat.
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In order to understand the implications of equation (10.2) for analysis of the coordinated eff ects of merger, it is useful to think of the fi rms participating in a market arrayed in terms of their value of s i Q(P)/k i T. The fi rm with the lowest value of the s i Q(P)/k i T term is hardest to convince to join the coordinated arrangement, as it benefi ts least from coordination relative to its ability to profi t by cheating. Suppose further that all fi rms would fi nd coordination more profi table than cheating for at least a small increase in price above the level that prevailed absent coordination, and picture the fi rms raising the coordinated price a little at a time (perhaps through leader-follower behavior). As price rises, the left hand side of equation (10.2) declines for all fi rms. At some coordinated price, perhaps one below the monopoly price P*, the incentives facing the fi rm with the lowest value of the s i Q(P)/k i T term will switch. Equation (10.2) will no longer be satisfi ed for that fi rm, so the fi rm will prefer to cheat rather than to cooperate. Under such circumstances, coordination is no longer feasible for the industry. To forestall this outcome, the fi rms participating in the market would be expected to stop raising price just short of the level that would induce cheating rather than cooperation from the fi rm with the lowest value of s i Q(P)/k i T. Doing so would preserve coordination, but the coordinating fi rms would not achieve the joint profi t-maximizing outcome.
As this model suggests, coordination in general can be expected to be imperfect and incomplete. 35 Coordinating fi rms have an incentive to choose terms of coordination (here the coordinated price P) that increase joint profi ts -but to stop making coordination more eff ective at the point where doing so would drive a fi rm to cheat. 36 In the resulting coordinated equilibrium, one fi rm would fi nd itself close to indiff erent between cooperation and cheating, while the other market participants would fi nd equation (10.2) readily satisfi ed, not a close call. The fi rm that is nearly indiff erent between continued coordination and cheating is termed in antitrust parlance the industry 'maverick'. 37 It limits the success of coordination, preventing price from reaching the monopoly level. The industry price is the maximum price at which the maverick would fi nd cooperation profi table, not the higher industry price the other fi rms would select if their views controlled. In order for the market participants to coordinate more eff ectively -raise price further -the maverick's incentives must change so that the constraint it imposes is relaxed. One way that could happen is through merger.
Maverick fi rms play an important role in merger analysis, because a merger can alter the incentives of the maverick, reducing the constraint imposed by the maverick, and thereby allow the coordinating fi rms to raise price closer to the monopoly level. The most direct way for a merger to do so is through an acquisition involving a maverick.
To see why, suppose fi rm 1 is the maverick, nearly indiff erent between cooperation and cheating. Then, using equation (10.2),
. Suppose fi rm 1 merges with another fi rm, fi rm 2, which is not indiff erent but prefers coordination, so
The merged fi rm's market share in the coordinated consensus is assumed to equal the sum of the two fi rms' premerger shares, and its production capacity is the sum of the capacities of each. Then the merged fi rm is not indiff erent, but prefers coordination to cheating -that is, that
. 38 In short, if the fi rms in the industry are coordinating pre-merger and there is just one maverick, a merger involving the maverick will relax the constraint on more eff ective coordination, allowing the coordinating fi rms to raise price. Price will rise until some fi rm becomes indiff erent between coordination and cheating. The new maverick could be the merged fi rm, or it could be some other fi rm, perhaps the one that was second most likely to cheat before the merger.
In this simple example, a merger involving non-mavericks will not aff ect the constraint that the maverick, fi rm 1, imposes on coordination. Only a merger among mavericks will relax the constraint, make coordination more eff ective, and lead to a higher coordinated price. This result highlights the particular danger of coordinated competitive eff ects that arises when mergers involve mavericks. An acquisition involving a maverick will most likely relax a constraint on coordination, leading to higher prices.
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Within this framework, horizontal mergers aff ect the likelihood and eff ectiveness of coordination by altering the constraints imposed by maverick producers. The straightforward story set forth above does not exhaust the ways that a merger could alter the constraint on coordination imposed by the maverick, however. 40 Stepping outside the model, an acquisition involving a non-maverick may have a variety of eff ects on competition. First, a merger of non-mavericks could alter the incentives of the industry maverick. 41 For example, if the merger means that the punishment facing a cheating maverick would become more severe, the maverick might be induced to accept a higher industry price without cheating.
42 But the merger of non-mavericks could instead lead the maverick to balk at charging the pre-merger price, and instead cause price to fall. 43 Second, a merger among non-mavericks could, by virtue of its effi ciencies, create a new maverick fi rm that would prefer a lower coordinated price than before. Third, a merger involving non-mavericks could lead to higher prices by facilitating exclusion of the maverick.
Notwithstanding this range of alternatives, it is appropriate for antitrust analysis of coordinated eff ects to emphasize the concern arising from a merger involving a maverick. As the model above suggests, a merger involving a maverick will most likely harm competition by making coordination more eff ective. Accordingly, Carl Shapiro and I have proposed that if the market is conducive to coordination, then proof that an acquisition involves a likely maverick should be a suffi cient basis to presume harm to competition from coordinated eff ects. 44 As a practical matter, it will not always be possible to identify the eff ect of the merger on the constraint imposed by the maverick in a market conducive to coordination. Under such circumstances, greater concentration raises the odds that any particular merger involves a maverick. For this reason, Shapiro and I have also proposed that if the market is conducive to coordination and the likely maverick cannot reliably be identifi ed, then high market concentration should raise a presumption that the merger involves a maverick, and, consequently, that the merger would lead to adverse coordinated eff ects.
45 Such a presumption would plausibly kick in at lower concentration levels if the merger narrows asymmetries among the sellers, as by reducing the diff erences among sellers in product attributes or seller costs or increasing the extent of multimarket contact among fi rms. Greater symmetry among sellers would tend to reduce the odds that a maverick fi rm would prefer a substantially lower coordinated price than its rivals, and thus tend to lead to higher prices by making coordination more eff ective.
B Unilateral competitive eff ects
Unilateral competitive eff ects of mergers arise from the loss of direct competition between the merging fi rms, without requiring a change in behavior by non-merging rivals. They most commonly appear in markets where fi rms sell diff erentiated products, and this industry setting will be presumed in the discussion below.
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Consider a diff erentiated product industry in which each fi rm sells only one product. In the pre-merger setting, fi rm 1 charges price P When the fi rst fi rm raises price, it loses sales as some buyers switch to their second choice product (which could be no product at all, but instead a decision not to purchase from any seller). Some of those buyers may switch to the product sold by a second fi rm. Now suppose the fi rst fi rm and the second fi rm agree to merge. The result is to change the merged fi rm's profi t-maximization calculus with respect to the fi rst product (the product formerly sold by the fi rst fi rm). After the merger the direct gains from raising the price of the fi rst product continue to equal DP 1 (Q 1 ). But the net losses from raising price are no longer equal to (P 1 − C 1 )DQ 1 . The reason is that some of the DQ 1 lost sales from the fi rst product lead to increased purchases of the second product, allowing the merged fi rm to recapture some of the lost profi ts from raising the price of the fi rst product in the form of increased profi ts on the price of the second product. 50 The increased profi ts on the second product can be represented as (P 2 − C 2 ) DQ 2 , with 0 , DQ 2 ≤ DQ 1 . 51 Now the merged fi rm's profi ts from raising the price of the fi rst product to a small amount above the pre-merger price are unambiguously positive, as DP
Before the merger, the fi rst fi rm declined to raise price further because the gains from doing so were not more than the losses. After the merger, the new fi rm recognizes that it can recapture some of those losses, so now fi nds it profi table to raise the price of the fi rst product.
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This is not the end of the story for the merged fi rm, as it may also have an incentive to increase the price of the second product. The higher price for the second product may lead some of the DQ 1 customers who switched from the fi rst product to the second to stick instead with the fi rst product (increasing the profi ts from raising the price of the fi rst product), or switch to a third alternative (reducing the profi ts from raising the price of the fi rst product). The merged fi rm will choose a profi t-maximizing price for both products simultaneously, taking a range of direct eff ects and feedbacks like these into account.
54 It will also consider price and 'repositioning' responses by third fi rms.
55 But one central idea underlying unilateral eff ects is captured in the example: a merger allows the fi rm to recapture some of the profi ts that would previously have been lost as a result of competition with its merger partner, removing a constraint on pricing and leading to higher prices.
A complementary way to understand unilateral competitive eff ects is to recognize that before the merger, competition from all fi rm 1's rivals, including competition from fi rm 2, contributed to determining h 1 , the elasticity of the residual demand function facing fi rm 1. The more aggressive fi rm 2's competitive response to fi rm 1 pre-merger -the less willing fi rm 2 was to match fi rm 1's price increase or the more that fi rm 2 would expand output when fi rm 1's output contracted -the greater fi rm 1's loss of sales to fi rm 2 if fi rm 1 raised price pre-merger, so the more elastic fi rm 1's premerger residual demand. By merging with fi rm 2, however, fi rm 1 removed the competitive response of product 2 to a price increase on product 1. 56 In consequence, the residual demand for product 1 will become less elastic, making it profi table for the merged fi rm to increase the fi rst product's price.
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These two complementary ways of understanding unilateral eff ectsthat they allow the fi rm to recapture previously lost profi ts, and that they remove the competitive response of an important rival -share the idea that the merger leads to higher prices by lessening a prior competitive constraint. Nothing in either way of understanding unilateral competitive eff ects obviously or necessarily requires market defi nition or relates the magnitude of unilateral eff ects to market concentration.
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The reason is simple. In diff erentiated product markets, a fi rm's market share refl ects the fraction of potential customers who select its product as their fi rst choice. But the constraint imposed by any particular rival depends instead on the fi rm's customers' second choices -in particular, on the extent to which its merger partner's product is the second choice for those of its customers who would switch rather than stay loyal were the fi rst fi rm to raise price. Thus, market shares are informative as to likely unilateral eff ects to the extent that customer second choices are distributed similarly to customer fi rst choices.
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To see how concentration might matter in unilateral eff ects analysis, it is useful to employ a model developed by Carl Shapiro. 60 Suppose that before merger, two fi rms each sell a single diff erentiated product, that demand is linear and that the oligopoly interaction is Bertrand. Product units are defi ned such that the slope of each demand curve is −1, so the demand function for product 1, for example, is written x 1 5 A 1 − p 1 1 a 21 p 2 . Here x represents quantity sold and p represents price, with subscripts indicating fi rm. The parameter a 21 is the diversion ratio from product 2 to product 1.
61 It represents the fraction of sales lost by fi rm 2 when it raises the price of product 2 that are captured by product 1. Firm 1's marginal cost is denoted c 1 .
Using this framework, Shapiro derives, among other things, a simple lower bound approximation formula to characterize the eff ect of a merger between fi rm 1 and fi rm 2 on the price of product 2. . This approximation formula implements the 'recapture of lost profi ts' perspective on unilateral eff ects, as it relates the post-merger markup for product 2 to the product of the diversion ratio (a measure of the fraction of sales recaptured through merger) and the pre-merger markup on product 1 (a measure of the magnitude of the additional profi t on each recaptured sale). It is an underestimate because it ignores feedbacks that arise when the merged fi rm also alters the price of product 1.
Market concentration matters in this analysis if diversion ratios are related to market shares. In particular, suppose that when the price of product 2 increases, product 1 captures the fraction s 1 /(1 − s 2 ) of the sales lost by product 2. Then a 21 5 s 1 /(1 − s 2 ). This representation is consistent with the idea that the second choices of the customers who switch from product 2 are distributed the same way as the fi rst choices. 64 With this assumption, the approximation formula for the post-merger increase in the price of product 2 becomes: implies that in a diff erentiated product industry in which all fi rms price at about the same level and have 40 per cent margins, a merger between a fi rm with 50 per cent of the market and a fi rm with 20 per cent of the market would lead to an increase in the price (that is, a value of L*) of about 8 per cent for one product and 12.5 per cent for the other. The products would have to be in very diff erent market segments, appealing to diff erent groups of customers, in order to make it plausible that a substantial number of customers switching away from their fi rst-choice product would not shift to the merger partner's product and that the price eff ects of merger would be much smaller than is suggested by application of equation (10.3). 66 Put diff erently, errors in measuring the diversion ratios that arise from using market shares as a rough proxy for them are unlikely to be large enough to make implausible the inference that prices will rise non-trivially following this merger when market shares are so high, absent additional information showing that switchers from each merging fi rm would rarely prefer the product sold by the other fi rm.
In some cases, it may be easy to exploit this implication of high concentration for unilateral eff ects. When Whirlpool acquired Maytag in 2006, for example, Whirlpool accounted for about half the US market in both residential washing machines and residential dryers, while Maytag had about one-fi fth of each. Those high shares, combined with the observations that both Whirlpool and Maytag had storied American brand names and both specialized in lower-end, top-loading washing machines (while new rivals from abroad specialized in high-end, front-loading machines), should have provided a reasonable basis for presuming that the merger would lead to adverse unilateral competitive eff ects. 67 Another example comes from the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) investigation of General Electric's proposed acquisition of AgfaNDT in 2003. In the US, both fi rms supplied ultrasonic non-destructive testing (NDT) equipment, used by quality control and safety engineers to inspect materials without damaging them. The FTC reported that in each of three markets:
the merging parties were the two largest fi rms, and the combined fi rm would have had a market share of greater than 70% in each of the markets. Documents and testimonial evidence indicated that the rivalry between GE and Agfa was particularly close, and that, for a wide variety of industry participants, the products of the two fi rms were their fi rst and second choices. 68 Equation (10.3) suggests, based on market concentration alone, that the GE/Agfa merger would have led to substantial price elevation in one or both fi rm's products, unless the fi rms were distant rivals serving diff erent groups of customers (thus calling into question the likelihood that the products of the two fi rms were fi rst and second choices for a substantial group of customers). 69 Additional information cited by the FTC, from documents and testimony, made it clear to the agency that this implication of the market shares was not misleading. The Commission obtained a consent order requiring divestiture of GE's NDT business.
If market concentration is lower, more information about the distribution of customer second choices would be required before inferring diversion ratios and potentially identifying harm to competition from merger based on market shares. Suppose, for example, that the merging fi rms each have market shares of 10 per cent, pre-merger margins are 40 per cent for each, and the pre-merger prices of each are similar. Equation (10.3) would imply a post-merger price increase slightly more than 2 per cent for each. Now there would be more concern about the possibility of errors in measuring the diversion ratios that arise from using market shares as a rough proxy for them, and thus more concern about whether the inference that prices will rise non-trivially following the merger could be mistaken. Accordingly, the lower the merging fi rms' market shares, the greater the need to analyze additional information about diversion ratios before inferring harm to competition from merger and the weaker the presumption of harm to competition from unilateral eff ects based on market shares. Uncertainty about the market defi nition could similarly weaken the presumption of harm to competition from high merging fi rm shares in a unilateral eff ects case. 70 If the available information permits informed and reasonably precise estimates of diversion ratios or the change in residual demand elasticities resulting from merger, then presumptions of harm to competition can be based on this information, without need for defi ning markets or measuring concentration. 71 Under such circumstances, there would be no need to defi ne markets in order to determine the likely unilateral competitive eff ects of merger. 72 Alternatively, presumptions of harm to competition in unilateral eff ects cases can reasonably be based on market shares, through application of equation (10.3), consistent with a 'default' assumption that the diversion ratios between the products sold by the merging fi rms are proportional to their market shares, though the strength of that presumption should vary with the magnitude of the market shares. 
VI Conclusion
Both the economic and legal literatures relating market concentration to the competitive eff ects of merger are framed around the question of whether market share statistics provide a good basis for presuming harm to competition from merger. The general issue is a decision theory problem of determining whether error and enforcement costs are minimized by conditioning liability (or, with a presumption, a higher probability of liability) on a limited factual showing, here related to market shares. From this perspective, it makes sense for enforcers and courts to rely upon a presumption of harm to competition based on market concentration and market shares if harm to competition from merger is correlated with concentration and shares, if shares can be observed inexpensively (relative to alternative ways of identifying competitive problems), and if it would be expensive for a fi rm contemplating an anticompetitive merger to manipulate market concentration and share measurements in order to avoid enforcement. 74 The analysis in this chapter makes the case for a qualifi ed use of market share statistics as a basis for presuming harm to competition from merger. 75 It explains when and why market shares and market concentration provide a good signal of harm to competition from merger. When better evidence is available -in a coordinated eff ects case, about the identity of the maverick and the eff ect of merger on its behavior; and in a unilateral eff ects case, about diversion ratios and gross margins or the eff ect of the merger on each fi rm's residual demand elasticity -then market concentration statistics are unlikely to contribute much. But in the many cases in which such evidence is weak or lacking, inferences from evidence on market structure may be appropriate. This evidence is not perfectly correlated with harm to competition (in part because shares and concentration relate to the underlying economic theory diff erently in a coordinated case from a unilateral one); shares and concentration are not always easy to measure (particularly because market defi nition can be diffi cult); and shares and concentration are not free from manipulation by the merging fi rms (through the contest over market defi nition) -but shares and concentration can nevertheless be useful in predicting adverse competitive eff ects of merger.
In both coordinated and unilateral eff ects cases, as indicated above, there is a sensible basis for inferring harm to competition from market concentration or market shares. An important challenge for antitrust law in the future -one that is both legal and economic -is to specify the deference that should be accorded to a presumption based on concentration and shares in a legal standard or jury instruction. The goal should be to allocate burdens of production and persuasion in ways that give presumptions based on market concentration and market shares an appropriate weight in light of the modern understanding of the role concentration can play in the analysis of the competitive eff ects of horizontal mergers. 74 Antitrust L.J. 129 (2007) , which provides a detailed discussion of a wide range of conceptual and practical issues that arise in defi ning markets. 16. In a more fully specifi ed model, marginal cost might depend on output and exogenous cost-shift variables like factor prices; demand (and hence the demand elasticity) might depend on output and exogenous demand-shift variables like income; and oligopoly conduct might depend on marginal cost, demand and the exogenous variables in the model. Some theories of oligopoly, for example, suggest that oligopoly conduct may depend on market concentration or unanticipated declines in demand. 17. Under the Merger Guidelines, market participants include fi rms currently selling the products in the locations in the market, and also 'uncommitted' entrants that could do so quickly and with little sunk (unrecoverable) costs of entry. Uncommitted entrants are assigned market shares equal to the capacity they could profi tably divert into the market in the event price was to rise a small amount. 18. Market shares may be measured in various units, most commonly sales revenues, sales units or production capacity. The analysis of the merger usually does not turn on the units in which market shares are measured, but General Dynamics was one such case. For further discussion of measurement units, see Gregory J. Werden, Assigning Market Shares, 70 Antitrust L.J. 67 (2002 87 (1980) . Concentration from mergers is also sometimes described in terms of the number of signifi cant fi rms participating in the market. Thus a merger in a market with four such fi rms might be described as reducing the number of signifi cant rivals from four to three. 20. George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964) . A simplifi ed sketch of Stigler's idea supposes that every buyer purchases one unit, industry customers arrive independently, and the probability that a customer would patronize a given fi rm after a cartel has formed equals the fi rm's market share (a measure of its past success in attracting customers). Under the assumption that no fi rm is cheating, the distribution of any fi rm's customer arrivals during a period can be characterized as binomial with probability equal to its market share s of the n industry customers. The expected sales for any fi rm equal ns, and the variance of fi rm sales equals ns (1−s) . In this framework, a fi rm will learn that some rival is cheating only by experiencing a surprising sales drought, basing that conclusion on statistical inference. Thus, the scope for secret cheating, and the instability of a cartel, grows larger as the variance of each fi rm's sales grows. The average variance of fi rm sales across the industry equals [1/n] S ns(1 − s) 5 (1-Ss 2 ) 5 (1-HHI). This observation suggests that the stability of an industry cartel is inversely related to the HHI. When the HHI is high, it is diffi cult for fi rms to cheat without detection, deterring cheating and making the cartel stable.
Notes
There are a number of diffi culties with the argument as presented here. For example, it does not explicitly model a fi rm's decision to cheat rather than cooperate, or how a fi rm would respond if it believes that a rival has cheated; uncertainty about inferring n is not modeled; and it is not obvious why cartel stability would turn on the average variance in sales rather than the smallest sales variance. Contemporary theoretical models of cartel stability address some of these issues by working instead within a repeated game setting. E.g. Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 Econometrica 87 (1984) .
An alternative argument relating the HHI to cartel stability, not suggested by Stigler, assumes that a fi rm's gains from cheating decrease as its market share rises (perhaps because it has more to lose from the cartel breaking down) and that the likelihood that its cheating would be detected by rivals rises with its market share (perhaps because rivals can more easily learn whether larger fi rms are cheating). Then each fi rm's expected gains from cheating rise with s (1 − s) . Assuming that each fi rm's decision to cheat is independent, then the odds that some fi rm will cheat would be related to S s(1 − s) 5 (1 − HHI). 21. In general, in such models, the index of oligopoly conduct q from equation (10.1) can be thought of as proportional to the HHI. In particular, when the fi rms have constant (though diff ering) marginal costs and reach a Cournot equilibrium, then each fi rm's price-cost margin equals its market share divided by the industry demand elasticity. Accordingly, if L in equation (10.1) 74 Antitrust L.J. 575 (2007) . 26. Supply expansion by market participants that are not part of the coordinated arrangement would be considered as part of the analysis of competitive eff ects, but is not discussed further here. 27. Firms might reach consensus with heterogeneous, complex, or changing products through information exchange or the adoption of focal rules to simplify the coordination task. The latter approach might involve, for example, adopting a common set of product defi nitions, or, even if product defi nitions diff er, adopting a common practice of quoting prices as discounts off book. 28. From the perspective of these models, the value of q from equation (10.1) Economics (2008) . 30. Side payments, such as payments to a high cost fi rm not to produce, are ruled out by assumption. In consequence, the coordinating fi rms may not be able to reach the joint profi t-maximizing outcome. 31. The discount factor can be expressed as d 5 1/(11r), where r is the interest rate between two periods of time. 32. The value of T is assumed identical for all fi rms. 33. If T 5 1, then k i , which was previously defi ned as the fi rm's production capacity, can be reinterpreted as the additional amount the fi rm can sell without detection if it decides to cheat. 34. As T grows large, the left hand side of equation (10.2) can be made arbitrarily small, while the right hand side approaches unity (as 0 , d , 1). 35. Coordinating fi rms are unlikely to achieve an outcome that maximizes their joint profi ts for a number of reasons, some of which are not captured by the model. First, they may not be able to punish cheating as strongly as would be necessary. In addition, they may Gerrit De Geest -10.4337/9781849805285.00016 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/27/2018 01:52:18AM via free access not be able to allocate joint profi ts in a manner satisfactory to all because they may be unable to make side payments. Third, they may need to reduce the coordinated price below the joint profi t-maximizing level or tolerate occasional price wars in order to deter cheating in an environment of uncertainty. Fourth, they may have diffi culty identifying the joint profi t-maximizing outcome when coordinating over multiple products or markets without communicating. 36. Cheating is rarely the cause of cartel breakups because colluding fi rms develop organizational methods to detect and deter it. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success? 44 J. Econ. Lit. 43, 75-9 (2006) . Rather, breakups more commonly result from the desire of some members to renegotiate the terms of the coordinated outcome following unexpected shocks to demand or other forms of instability in the economic environment, or from the inability of the cartel to deter or accommodate entry. Although renegotiation is not permitted within the model set forth in the text, equation (10.2) suggests one reason why it might take place. Suppose that in the coordinated arrangement, the output shares (that is, the market shares s i ) are allocated in the same way as capacity shares (k i /Q); this is a possible focal rule for determining market shares. Then fi rms would have an incentive to expand capacity in order to be awarded a higher market share. The maverick could place itself in a particularly strong bargaining position by doing so, as a higher capacity could threaten to tip its incentives from cooperation to cheating, and thus allow the maverick to impose substantial costs on the other fi rms if they do not award it a higher market share. 37. See US DoJ & FTC (1992) Horizontal Merger Guidelines §2.12. In an oligopoly, the common industry setting leading to antitrust scrutiny of horizontal mergers, if fi rms are able to coordinate it is likely that some fi rm, and most likely a single fi rm, will fi nd itself just willing to participate in the coordinated arrangement, nearly indiff erent between cooperating and cheating. Put diff erently, in oligopoly markets where it is plausible that fi rms are coordinating imperfectly pre-merger, it is possible to imagine multiple mavericks but that is unlikely unless the maverick fi rms are nearly identical. Accordingly, the remainder of this discussion will presume that there is just one maverick. Org. 283 (1988) . 50. Note that fi rm 2's product does not have to be the best substitute for fi rm 1's product -perhaps more of the lost sales go to some third fi rm's product. What matters is that a signifi cant group of fi rm 1's customers would respond to a higher price for fi rm 1's product by switching to fi rm 2's product. For those customers, fi rm 2's product is their second choice at pre-merger prices. Accordingly, a merger between sellers of diff erentiated products may harm competition even when most of the customers switching away from fi rm 1's product select the products of non-merging fi rms or do without the product entirely, and even when some third product is the second choice for more of fi rm 1's customers than is the product sold by fi rm 2. 51. That is, the increased profi ts equal the price-cost margin on the second product, which could be diff erent from the price-cost margin on the fi rst product, times the increase in second product sales (which will be a portion of the lost sales on the fi rst product). 52. In this representation, sources of incremental profi ts from a small price rise are placed on the left hand side of the equation, while sources of incremental losses are placed on the right. 53. An alternative intuition arising from the same model arises from observing that after the merger, output expansion by the fi rst fi rm leads it to cannibalize some of the sales that would otherwise have gone to its merger partner. From this perspective, the merger can be thought of as lowering the marginal revenue obtained from selling the fi rst product or, equivalently, as raising that product's marginal cost (properly understood as incorporating an opportunity cost). Accordingly, the acquisition gives the merged fi rm an incentive to reduce output of the fi rst product. 49-67. 56 . Following the merger, fi rm 1 likely has an incentive to raise the price of both products.
The merged fi rm has an incentive to raise the price of the fi rst product because it knows that the acquisition will allow it to recapture some of the lost profi ts through increased sales of the second product. But it similarly has an incentive to raise the price of the second product -making the pricing response of the second product less aggressive than it would have been pre-merger. 57. This idea is implemented empirically in Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan,
The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product Diff erentiated Industries, 33 J. Indus. Econ. 427 (1985) . This method off ers a way of approximating the post-merger incentive to raise price based on the assumption that the merged fi rm reduces output of both products by the same percentage. (However, it does not provide an exact solution to the merged fi rm's joint profi t maximization problem.) One advantage of this approach over simulation methodologies based on using margin data and diversion ratios is that it does not require knowledge of the oligopoly solution concept or where e 21 is the cross elasticity of demand from product 2 to product 1, e 11 is the own elasticity of demand for product 1, and the x's are quantities for the two products. 62. Shapiro also derives the equations for an exact solution of the model. The approximation formula is simpler to apply. 63. Note that L 1 is a conventionally-defi ned Lerner Index, with the price after markup as the denominator, while the denominator of L* 2 is instead the price before markup. 64. The expression (1−s 2 ) appears in the denominator because customers switching away from product 2 do not choose product 2. The assumption that a 21 5 s 1 /(1 − s 2 ) ignores the possibility that some customers switch out of the market altogether, making the aggregate diversion ratio (total diversion to other products in the market as a fraction of total sales lost by product 2) less than unity. If the aggregate diversion ratio is less than unity, the approach set forth here would lead to an over-estimate of the (lower bound approximation to the) post-merger price increase. 65. If the fi rms are symmetric, and diversion ratios are related to market shares as indicated in the text (e.g., a 21 5 [s 1 /(1 − s 2 )]), then all diversion ratios reduce to a 5 1/(n − 1), where n is the number of fi rms pre-merger. Shapiro provides an exact formula for the 
